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ROBOTS AND OTHER artificial intelligence (AI) systems 
are transitioning from performing well-defined tasks 
in closed environments to becoming significant 
physical actors in the real world. No longer confined 
within the walls of factories, robots will permeate  
the urban environment, moving people and goods 
around, and performing tasks alongside humans. 
Perhaps the most striking example of this transition is 
the imminent rise of automated vehicles (AVs). AVs 
promise numerous social and economic advantages. 
They are expected to increase the efficiency of 
transportation, and free up millions of person-hours of 
productivity. Even more importantly, they promise to 
drastically reduce the number of deaths and injuries 
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 key insights
 ˽ Machines are assuming new roles in which 
they will make autonomous decisions 
that influence our lives. In order to avoid 
societal pushback that would slow the 
adoption of beneficial technologies, we 
must sort out the ethics of these decisions.
 ˽ Behavioral surveys and experiments 
can play an important role in identifying 
citizens’ expectations about the ethics 
of machines, but they raise numerous 
concerns that we illustrate with the ethics 
of driverless cars and the Moral Machine 
experiment.
 ˽ Data collected shows discrepancies 
between the preferences of the public, 
the experts, and citizens of different 
countries—calling for an interdisciplinary 
framework for the regulation of moral 
machines.
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the first human-made artifact to make 
autonomous decisions with potential 
life-and-death consequences on a broad 
scale. This marks a qualitative shift in 
the consequences of design choices 
made by engineers.
The decisions of AVs will generate 
indirect negative consequences, such 
as consequences affecting the physical 
integrity of third parties not involved in 
their adoption—for example, AVs may 
prioritize the safety of their passengers 
over that of pedestrians. Such negative 
consequences can have a large impact 
on overall well-being and economic 
growth. While indirect negative conse-
quences are typically curbed by central-
ized regulations and policies, this 
strategy will be challenging in the case 
of intelligent machines.
First, intelligent machines are often 
black boxes:24 it can be unclear how ex-
actly they process their input to arrive 
at a decision, even to those who actually 
programmed them in the first place.
Second, intelligent machines may 
be constantly learning and changing 
their perceptual capabilities or deci-
sion processes, outpacing human ef-
forts at defining and regulating their 
negative externalities. Third, even 
when an intelligent machine is shown 
to have made biased decisions,27 it can 
be unclear whether the bias is due to 
its decision process or learned from 
the human behavior it has been 
trained on or interacted with.
All these factors make it especially 
challenging to regulate the negative ex-
ternalities created by intelligent ma-
chines, and to turn them into moral 
machines. And if the ethics of machine 
behavior are not sorted out soon, it is 
likely that societal push-back will dras-
tically slow down the adoption of intel-
ligent machines—even when, like in 
the case of AVs, these machines prom-
ise widespread benefits.
Sorting out the ethics of intelligent 
machines will require a joint effort of 
engineers, who build the machines, 
and humanities scholars, who theorize 
about human values. The problem, 
though, is that these two communities 
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Figure 1. A visual depiction of the classic Trolley Problem as displayed in the Moral Machine 
interface.
A man in blue is standing by the railroad tracks when he notices an empty trolley rolling out 
of control. It is moving so fast that anyone it hits will die. Ahead on the main track are five 
people. There is one person standing on a side track that does not rejoin the main track.  
If the man in blue does nothing, the trolley will hit the five people on the main track, but not 
the one person on the side track. If the man in blue flips a switch next to him, it will divert 
the trolley to the side track where it will hit the one person, and not hit the five people on  
the main track. What should the man in blue do?
What should the man in blue do?
Common criticisms and responses regarding the crowdsourcing of AV ethics using the 
Trolley Problem method.
are not used to talking to each other. 
Ethicists, legal scholars, and moral 
philosophers are well trained in diag-
nosing moral hazards and identifying 
violations of laws and norms, but they 
are typically not trained to frame their 
recommendations in a programmable 
way. In parallel, engineers are not al-
ways capable of communicating the 
expected behaviors of their systems in 
a language that ethicists and legal the-
orists use and understand. Another ex-
ample is that while many ethicists may 
focus more on the normative aspect of 
moral decisions (that is, what we 
should do), most companies and their 
engineers may care more about the ac-
tual consumer behavior (what we actu-
ally do). These contrasting skills and 
priorities of the two communities 
make it difficult to establish a moral 
code for machines.
We believe that social scientists, 
and computational social scientists 
have a pivotal role to play as intermedi-
aries between engineers and humani-
ties scholars, in order to help them ar-
ticulate the ethical principles and 
priorities that society wishes to embed 
into intelligent machines. This enter-
prise will require elicitation of social 
expectations and preferences with re-
spect to machine-made decisions in 
high-stakes domains; to articulate 
these expectations and preferences in 
an operationalizable language; and to 
characterize quantitative methods that 
can help to communicate the ethical 
behavior of machines in an under-
standable way, in order for citizens—or 
regulatory agencies acting on their be-
half—to examine this behavior against 
their ethical preferences. This process, 
which we call ‘Society in The Loop’ 
(SITL),25 will have to be iterative, and it 
may be painfully slow, but it will be 
necessary for reaching a dynamic con-
sensus on the ethics of intelligent ma-
chines as their scope of usage and ca-
pabilities expands.
This article aims to provide a com-
pelling case to the computer science 
(CS) community to pay more attention 
to the ethics of AVs, an interdisciplinary 
topic that includes the use of CS tools 
(crowdsourcing) to approach a societal 
issue that relates to CS (AVs). In so do-
ing, we discuss the role of psychological 
experiments in informing the engineer-
ing and regulation of AVs,4,21 and we re-
Too Naïve Laypersons’ responses to public polls 
can be biased or ill-informed. Ethical 
trade-offs must be solved by policy 
experts, not majority voting.
Policymakers must know about the 
values most important to the public, 
so they can either accommodate these 
values, or anticipate frictions that need 
be explained. 
Too Simple Real accidents do not involve only two 
possible actions, and these actions do 
not have deterministic outcomes.
Highly complex scenarios would only 
allow for highly specific conclusions. 
Simplified scenarios zero in on the 
general principles that guide citizens’ 
ethical intuitions.
Too Improbable AV-Trolleys are based on very 
implausible sets of assumptions, and 
their actual probability of occurrence is 
too small to deserve attention.
Edge cases can have a massive impact 
on public opinion, and AV-Trolleys 
are the discrete form of a very real 
statistical problem.
Too Early AV-Trolleys regulations should be 
avoided at this early technological 
stage, because their consequences are 
hard to predict.
Even though it may be too early to 
regulate about AV-Trolleys, it is the 
right time to start crowdsourcing citizen 
preferences.
Too Disconnected Stated preferences are too disconnected 
from real actions
The behavior of human drivers 
is irrelevant to the proposed 
crowdsourcing task.
Too Distracting Car makers should focus on making 
AVs safer, instead of wasting time and 
resources on crowdsourcing ethical 
dilemmas.
True, and this is why we need 
computational social scientist to handle 
that task.
Too Scary Overexposing people to AV-Trolleys may 
scare them away, and be detrimental for 
their trust in the technology.
This is an empirical question, and our 
surveys did not find any
evidence for such an adverse effect.
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The only way out is to swerve to one 
side, crashing into a barrier and killing 
its sole passenger. What should the AV 
do?13,18 What if there are three passen-
gers in the car? What if two of these 
passengers are children?
The AV version of the Trolley Problem 
(AV-Trolley, henceforth) has become so 
popular that computer scientists, engi-
neers, and roboticists are endlessly asked 
about it, even when their work has noth-
ing to do with it. It has become the poster 
child in debates about the ethics of AI, 
among AV enthusiasts, technologists, 
moral psychologists, philosophers, and 
policymakers.3,18,22 Whether or not this 
prominence is deserved, the AV-Trolley is 
everywhere, and it is worth looking in de-
tail at the arguments that have been 
made for (but mainly against) its rele-
vance for the field of AVs, and for the im-
portance of polling citizens about the so-
lutions they might find acceptable (see 
the accompany table for a summary).
The citizens are too naïve. First, one 
may question the usefulness of seeking 
input from lay citizens when dealing 
with such complex issues as AV ethics. 
Certainly, using a simple thought ex-
periment such as the AV-Trolley makes 
it possible to poll citizens about their 
preferences. But what are we to do with 
their responses? Is it not dangerous, or 
even irresponsible, to seek the opin-
ions of naïve citizens whose responses 
may be biased or ill-informed? We very 
much agree that regulations of ethical 
trade-offs should be left to policy ex-
perts, rather than resolved by referen-
dum. But we also believe that policy 
experts will best serve the public inter-
est when they are well informed about 
citizens’ preferences, regardless of 
whether they ultimately decide to ac-
commodate these preferences.2 Some-
times, when policy experts cannot 
reach a consensus, they may use citi-
zens’ preferences as a tie-breaker. Oth-
er times, when policy experts find citi-
zens’ preferences problematic, and 
decide not to follow them, they must be 
prepared for the friction their policies 
will create and think carefully about 
how they will justify their choices in the 
public eye. Whether policy experts de-
cide to take a step toward the prefer-
ences of citizens, or to explain why they 
took a step away, they need to know 
about the preferences of citizens in the 
first place.
spond to major objections to both the 
Trolley Problem and crowdsourcing 
ethical opinions about that dilemma. 
We also describe our experience in 
building a public engagement tool 
called the Moral Machine, which asks 
people to make decisions about how an 
AV should behave in dramatic situa-
tions. This tool promoted public discus-
sion about the moral values expected of 
AVs and allowed us to collect some 40 
million decisions that provided a snap-
shot of current preferences about these 
values over the entire world.1
The Problem with  
the Trolley Problem
Today, more than ever, computer sci-
entists and engineers find themselves 
in a position where their work is hav-
ing major societal consequences.10,23 
As a result, there is increasing pressure 
on computer scientists to be familiar 
with the humanities and social sci-
ences in order to realize the potential 
consequences of their work on various 
stakeholders, to get training in ethics,16 
and to provide normative statements on 
how their machines should resolve mor-
al trade-offs. These are new missions 
for computer scientists, for which they 
did not always receive relevant training, 
and this pressure can sometimes result 
in frustration, instead of leading to the 
intended ideal outcomes.
The Trolley Problem provides a 
striking example of the contrast be-
tween what computer scientists are 
trained to do and what they are sud-
denly expected to do. Scientists work-
ing on AVs are constantly asked about 
their solution to the Trolley Problem, 
an infamous philosophical dilemmaa 
illustrated in Figure 1. At first glance, 
the Trolley Problem seems completely 
irrelevant to CS. Its 21st-century ver-
sion, however, goes like this: An AV 
with a brake failure is about to run over 
five pedestrians crossing the street. 
a The Trolley Problem, together with all its vari-
ants,11,28,29 is ubiquitous in studies of law and 
ethics. It was traditionally used to test ethi-
cal principles against moral intuitions. More 
recently, the Trolley Problem has been used 
extensively in moral psychology and neurosci-
ence to explore not how humans should make 
ethical decisions, but how they actually do so. 
This literature delivered deep insights into 
moral cognition, as well as about the contextu-
al factors that influence moral judgment.8,9,15
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lic trust in AVs. Such a low-probability, 
high-risk event is known as an edge 
case, and handling edge cases is im-
portant for the design of any product. 
Finally, even if AV-Trolley crashes are 
very rare, they can help to think about 
their statistical extension, the statisti-
cal trolley problem.5,14,19 In its discrete 
version, the AV-Trolley asks about a 
black-and-white, all-or-none situation 
where people choose who should live 
and who should certainly die. The sta-
tistical trolley problem ultimately in-
volves the same trade-offs, but ones 
that occur only when billions of deci-
sions about how minor risks should be 
allocated are aggregated over millions 
of miles driven. Imagine an AV driving 
in a middle lane between a truck and a 
cyclist. Depending on how much of a 
berth the AV gives either the truck or 
the cyclist, its behavior results in a 
shift of risk between itself, the truck, 
and the cyclist. This creates the prob-
lem of deciding which risk transfers 
are fair or acceptable. Suppose that 
conventional cars kill 100 people (80 
passengers and 20 cyclists). Program A 
kills only 20 people (15 passengers and 
five cyclists), and so does Program B 
(one passenger, 19 cyclists). What 
would be the morally preferable pro-
gram? Should 15 passengers die for 
five cyclists, or should one passenger 
die for 19 cyclists? This statistical trol-
ley problem is very real, but much 
more complex than its discrete ver-
sion. Data collected with the discrete 
version of the AV-Trolley do not solve 
its statistical version but provide a use-
ful starting point for experimental in-
vestigations of this statistical version.
Stated preferences are too disconnected 
from real actions. The idea of “crowd-
sourcing preferences” assumes that 
stated preferences provide useful evi-
dence about what respondents would 
actually do when faced with a physi-
cal situation with real life-or-death 
consequences. But previous work has 
showed that people’s stated prefer-
ences and their actual actions diverge 
in many contexts. In this case, studies 
that put subjects in simulators and 
prompt them to react, would provide a 
better measure of the actual prefer-
ences of respondents. While we agree 
with this assessment, we note that the 
behavior of human drivers is irrelevant 
to the proposed crowdsourcing task. 
The scenarios are too simple. Is the 
AV-Trolley too simplistic to be valu-
able? Real accidents do not involve 
only two possible actions, and these 
actions do not have deterministic out-
comes. AVs will have many options 
beyond staying or swerving, and it is 
not clear they will be able to precalcu-
late the consequences of all these ac-
tions with enough certainty. Many 
factors that would be relevant for real 
accidents are simply absent in an AV-
Trolley scenario. Note, however, that 
AV-Trolleys are meant to be abstract 
and simplified, in order to cleanly 
capture basic preferences. Using real-
istic crash scenarios would make it 
difficult to tease out the effect of mul-
tiple contributing factors and make it 
difficult to draw general conclusions 
beyond the highly specific set of cir-
cumstances that they feature. The AV-
Trolley can be used to conduct simpli-
fied controlled experiments, in which 
respondents are randomly assigned 
to different conditions (accident sce-
narios), in which the scenarios are 
simpler than what they would be in 
the real world, and in which every-
thing is kept constant but for the vari-
ables of interest.
The scenarios are too improbable. 
AV-Trolleys are based on a series of as-
sumptions that are extremely improb-
able. For example, respondents must 
accept the very unlikely premises that 
the AV is driving at an unsafe speed in 
view of a pedestrian crossing, that its 
brakes are failing, that there is no oth-
er way for it to stop, and that the pedes-
trians just stay there paralyzed. This 
combination of unlikely assumptions 
means the probability of an AV-Trolley 
actually happening is perhaps too 
small to deserve so much attention. Or 
is it? Philosopher Patrick Lin has laid 
down forceful arguments for the rele-
vance of the AV-Trolley, despite its tiny 
probability of occurrence.19 Even if we 
accept that AV-Trolley scenarios are ex-
tremely rare, their consequences may 
be extremely powerful. The few AV 
crashes that took place so far received 
massive coverage in the media, way be-
yond the coverage of all crashes hap-
pening the same year, and way beyond 
the positive coverage of progress in the 
performance of AVs. Similarly, a single 
occurrence of a real AV-Trolley crash 
could have massive impact on the pub-
AVs will have many 
options beyond 
staying or swerving, 
and it is not clear 
they will be able to 
precalculate the 
consequences of all 
these actions with 
enough certainty. 
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to AV-Trolleys) and found no statistical 
evidence for any adverse effect of the 
exposure to AV-Trolleys.6 People may 
not like some specific solutions to AV-
Trolleys, but they do not react nega-
tively to the problem itself.
Moral Machine
Having made it clear our support of the 
use of AV-Trolleys for crowdsourcing 
the ethics of automated vehicles, the 
reason for this support, and the limita-
tions of this crowdsourcing exercise, we 
now describe the platform we created 
for this purpose, and the data it allowed 
us to collect. In June 2016, we deployed 
Moral Machine (MM), a platform for 
gathering data on human perception 
of the moral acceptability of decisions 
made by AVs faced with choosing which 
humans to harm and which to save. 
MM fits the specifications of a massive 
online experimentation tool, given its 
scalability, accessibility to the online 
community, and the random assign-
ment of users to conditions. Another 
purpose to the platform is the facilita-
tion of public feedback, discussion of 
scenarios and acceptable outcomes, 
and especially public discussion of the 
moral questions relevant to self-driving 
vehicles, which was previously scarce.
The central data-gathering feature is 
the Judge mode, illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Moral Machine-Judge interface.
A pictorial representation of a dilemma faced by an AV. If the AV continues ahead it will hit 
and kill a group of pedestrians, including three adults and a dog, crossing on a red light. If the 
AV swerves, it will hit a barrier and result in the death of its sole passenger, a female athlete.
The goal of the crowdsourcing task 
here is not to capture the actual ac-
tions, but to capture what humans 
would believe (from the comfort of an 
armchair) to be the best course of ac-
tion. We can certainly do better with 
AVs than just imitating the reflexes of a 
stressed human driver in a split-second 
crash. Since cars can be programmed 
and humans cannot, cars can be pro-
grammed to do what humans would 
like to do, rather than what humans 
would actually decide, on impulse, in a 
split-second car crash.
It is too early to regulate. Even if AV-
Trolley crashes may have major conse-
quences for public trust, they still be-
long to a rather distant future. They 
involve highly automated, fully autono-
mous cars that may not be available for 
a while, whose behavior on the road is 
still unknown, and whose technology 
has not matured. For all these reasons, 
it may be too early to design regula-
tions for AV-Trolleys. This point relates 
to the “Collingridge dilemma,”7 which 
states that with every new technology, 
there are two competing concerns. On 
one hand, regulations are difficult to 
develop at an early technological stage 
because their consequences are diffi-
cult to predict. On the other hand, if 
regulations are postponed until the 
technology is widely used, then the rec-
ommendations come too late. In the 
case of AV-Trolleys, it would seem the 
ethical debate started well before the 
technology would be actually available, 
which means it might be premature to 
regulate just now. However, it is not too 
early to inform future regulators about 
the preferences of citizens. Perhaps 
right now is not the time to establish 
rules—but it is the right time to start 
crowdsourcing preferences, especially 
when this crowdsourcing effort might 
take several years.
The debate is too distracting. Car mak-
ers are in the business of making safe 
cars, not in the business of solving age-
old ethical dilemmas. By burdening 
them with the AV-Trolley, the criticism 
goes, we distract them from their real 
mission, which is to maximize the safe-
ty of AVs, and bring them to the public 
as soon as possible. This will be better 
achieved by directing their resources to 
safety engineering, than to philosophi-
cal musing or moral psychology. This is 
absolutely true, and this is why we be-
lieve that computational scientists have 
a critical role to play in crowdsourcing 
machine ethics, and in translating their 
results in a way that is useful to ethi-
cists, policymakers, and the car indus-
try. The burden must be shared, and 
computational social scientists are best 
equipped to handle this crowdsourcing 
of ethics. Not to mention it is highly im-
plausible the car industry would ever 
compromise car safety in order to invest 
in philosophy.
The crowdsourcing is too scary. One 
main objective of crowdsourcing the 
ethics of AVs is to find the best possi-
ble alignment between regulations 
and citizen preferences—and a major 
reason for doing so is to improve trust 
and social acceptance of AV technolo-
gy. But crowdsourcing AV ethics using 
AV-Trolleys could be counterproduc-
tive in that respect, since it focuses the 
attention of the public on scary, im-
probable edge cases. This is a serious 
concern, but also an empirical ques-
tion: Is it true that exposure to AV-Trol-
leys adversely affects public trust, ex-
citement, or general attitude toward 
AVs? Our team tested this possibility 
with both a correlational approach 
(measuring the link between prior ex-
posure to AV-Trolleys and attitude to-
ward AVs) and a causal approach (mea-
suring the effect of a very first exposure 
What should the self-driving car do?
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Figure 4. A society-in-the-loop framework for AV regulation.
The model does not represent an actual regulatory system, but it clarifies 
how a crowdsourcing platform like the Moral Machine fits into the broader 
regulatory system by providing data on societal norms.
sen so that each scenario tests specifi-
cally for a response along one of six di-
mensions (age, gender, fitness, social 
status, number, and species). Each user 
is presented with two randomly sam-
pled scenarios of each of the six dimen-
sions, in addition to one completely 
random scenario (that can have any 
number of characters on each side, and 
in any combination of characters). 
These together make the 13 scenarios 
per session. The order of the 13 scenari-
os is also counterbalanced over ses-
sions. In addition to the six dimensions, 
three other dimensions (intervention-
ism, relation to AV, and legality) are ran-
domly sampled in conjunction with ev-
ery scenario of the six dimensions. Each 



















tions of characters from a list of 20 dif-
ferent characters.
Upon deployment in 2016, the MM 
website got covered in various media 
outlets and went viral beyond all expec-
tations. Accordingly, the website’s 
publicity has allowed us to collect the 
largest dataset on AI ethics ever (40 
million decisions by millions of visi-
tors from 233 countries and territories 
to date).
The results drawn from the data col-
lected through MM were published two 
years ago.1 The study reports two main 
findings: First, among the nine tested 
attributes, three attributes received 
considerably higher approval rate than 
the rest. These are the preference to 
spare humans over pets, the prefer-
ence to spare more characters over few-
er characters, and the preference to 
spare the younger humans over the 
older humans.
Second, while responses from most 
countries agree on the directions of the 
preferences, the magnitude of these 
preferences are considerably different. 
And countries’ aggregate responses 
broadly cluster into three main clus-
ters: Western (including a majority of 
English-speaking, Catholic, Orthodox, 
and Protestant countries), Eastern (in-
cluding a majority of Islamic, Confu-
cian, and South Asian countries, and 
Southern (comprising Latin America 
and former French colonies). The find-
ings also presented predictive factors 
of country-level differences. One exam-
ple is the strength of rule of law in a 
country being correlated with a stron-
ger preference to spare the lawful.
Providing a full discussion about the 
policy implications of these findings is 
beyond the scope of this article. How-
ever, we note here a summary of the im-
plications. In 2016, Germany became 
the first country to draft regulations for 
AVs. The country formed a committee 
of experts to draft ethical guidelines for 
automated vehicles.20 Comparing the 
preferences we collected via MM to the 
German commission report, we notice 
that while there is some overlap be-
tween the opinions of the public and 
the experts (for example, both agree on 
sacrificing animals in order to spare 
human life), there are also key points of 
disagreement (for example, while the 
public largely approves of sparing chil-
dren at the cost of the elderly, the ex-
In this mode, users are presented with 
a series of 13 moral dilemma scenari-
os, each with two possible outcomes. 
The MM restricted scenarios to just 
two outcomes and did not, for exam-
ple, offer the solution to drive more 
slowly and stop safely. This was done 
on purpose, to ensure participants 
would have to face difficult ethical de-
cisions, without being able to select a 
completely satisfying resolution. While 
this methodological choice was justi-
fied in the specific context of the MM 
project, safe driving and appropriate 
speed do constitute critically impor-
tant issues for the broader debate 
about the ethics of AVs.
The scenarios are generated using 
randomization under constraints, cho-
Figure 3. The ranking of countries according to the average preference to spare the lawful 
(pedestrians crossing at the “walk” signal, instead of the “wait” signal). 
All countries show preference for sparing the lawful at the cost of the unlawful. 
The top five countries in terms of readiness index17 are highlighted in red,  





















































































































































MARCH 2020  |   VOL.  63  |   NO.  3  |   COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM     55
contributed articles
12. Gao, P., Hensley, R., and Zielke, A. A road map to the future 
for the auto industry. McKinsey Quarterly, (Oct. 2014).
13. Goodall, N. Ethical decision making during automated 
vehicle crashes. Transportation Research Record: J. 
Transportation Research Board 2424 (2014), 58–65.
14. Goodall, N.J. Away from trolley problems and toward 
risk management. Applied Artificial Intelligence 30, 8 
(2016), 810–821.
15. Greene, J.D., Sommerville, R.B., Nystrom, L.E., Darley, 
J.M., and Cohen, J.M. An fMRI investigation of 
emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science 
293, 5537 (2001), 2105–2108.
16. Huff, C. and Furchert, A. Toward a pedagogy of ethical 
practice. Commun. ACM 57, 7 (July 2014), 25–27.
17. KPMG International. Autonomous Vehicles 
Readiness Index: Assessing countries openness and 
preparedness for autonomous vehicles; https://assets.
kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2018/01/avri.pdf
18. Lin, P. The ethics of autonomous cars. The Atlantic (2013).
19. Lin, P. Robot cars and fake ethical dilemmas.  
Forbes (2017).
20. Luetge, C. The German ethics code for automated 
and connected driving. Philosophy & Technology 30, 4 
(2017), 547–558.
21. Malle, B.F., Scheutz, M., Arnold, T., Voiklis, J., and 
Cusimano, C. Sacrifice one for the good of many? 
People apply different moral norms to human and 
robot agents. In Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM/
IEEE Iintern. Conf. Human-Robot Interaction. ACM, 
2015, 117–124.
22. Marshall, A. Lawyers, not ethicists, will solve the 
robocar ‘Trolley Problem.’ WIRED (May 28, 2017).
23. O’Neil, C. Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data 
Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy. 
Broadway Books, 2016.
24. Pasquale, F. The Black Box Society: The Secret 
Algorithms that Control Money and Information. 
Harvard University Press, 2015
25. Rahwan, I. Society-in-the-loop: Programming the 
algorithmic social contract. Ethics and Information 
Technology 20, 1 (2018), 5–14.
26. Sütfeld, L.R., Ehinger, B.V., König, P., and Pipa, G. How 
does the method change what we measure? Comparing 
virtual reality and text-based surveys for the assessment 
of moral decisions in traffic dilemmas. (2019).
27. Sweeney, L. Discrimination in online ad delivery.  
Queue 11, 3 (2013), 10.
28. Thomson, J.J. Killing, letting die, and the trolley 
problem. The Monist 59, 2 (1976), 204–217.
29. Thomson, J.J. The trolley problem. The Yale Law J. 
94, 6 (1985), 1395–1415.
30. Van Arem, B., Driel, C., and Visser, R. The impact of 
cooperative adaptive cruise control on traffic-flow 
characteristics. IEEE Trans. Intelligent Transportation 
Systems 7, 4 (2006), 429–436
Edmond Awad (e.awad@exeter.ac.uk) is a lecturer in 
the Department of Economics at the  University of Exeter 
Business School, Exeter, U.K. 
Sohan Dsouza (dsouza@mit.edu) is a research assistant 
at MIT Media Lab, Cambridge, MA, USA.
Jean-François Bonnefon (jfbonnefon@gmail.com)  
is a research director at the Toulouse School  
of Economics (TSM-R), CNRS, Université Toulouse 
Capitole, Toulouse, France.
Azim Shariff (afshariff@gmail.com) is an associate 
professor at the University of British Columbia,  
Vancouver, Canada.
Iyad Rahwan (rahwan@mpib-berlin.mpg.de) is a director 
of the Center for Humans & Machines, Max-Planck 
Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany,  
and an associate professor at MIT Media Lab,  
Cambridge, MA, USA.
Copyright held by authors/owners.  
Publication rights licensed to ACM.
perts prohibit any discrimination 
based on age). While the experts are not 
required to cater to the public’s prefer-
ences when making ethical decisions, 
they may be interested in knowing the 
views of the public, especially in cases 
where the right decision is difficult to 
discern, and where it may be important 
to gauge and anticipate public reaction 
to important decisions.
Clearly, this was the case for Germa-
ny. What would be the case for other 
countries? To date, Germany remains 
the only country with any guidelines 
for AVs. Once other countries form 
their own guidelines, they may end up 
being similar or different. This leads to 
our second main finding: Program-
ming ethical decisions in AVs using the 
same rules is likely to get different lev-
els of push-back in different countries. 
For example, if AVs are programmed in 
a way that disadvantages jaywalkers, 
such AVs may be judged more accept-
able in some countries (where the rule 
of law is stronger) than in others.
The possibility of seeing this hap-
pening might manifest itself sooner 
than we expect. A recent article by 
KPMG reported on the top countries in 
terms of readiness for AVs.17 According 
to the report, the readiest five coun-
tries are the Netherlands, Singapore, 
the U.S., Sweden, and the U.K. Figure 3 
shows that even these top five coun-
tries have some disagreement over the 
magnitude of preference for sparing 
the lawful. This could mean that a rule 
such as programming AVs to increase 
safety for law-abiding citizens at the 
cost of jaywalkers, while expected to 
gain high acceptability in the Nether-
lands and Singapore, may stir anger in 
the U.S., Sweden, and the U.K.
A Regulatory Framework
As we argued at the beginning of this 
article, we believe bringing about ac-
countable intelligent machines that 
embody human ethics requires an 
interdisciplinary approach. First, en-
gineers build and refine intelligent 
machines, and tell us how they are ca-
pable of operating. Second, scholars 
from the humanities—philosophers, 
lawyers, social theorists—propose how 
machines ought to behave, and identify 
hidden moral hazards in the system. 
Third, behavioral scientists, armed 
with tools for public engagement and 
data collection like the MM, provide a 
quantitative picture of the public’s trust 
in intelligent machines, and of their ex-
pectations of how they should behave.b 
Finally, regulators monitor and quan-
tify the performance of machines in the 
real world, making this data available 
to engineers and citizens, while using 
their enforcement tools to adjust the 
incentives of engineers and corpora-
tions building the machines.
We summarize this regulatory ar-
chitecture in Figure 4, clarifying where 
crowdsourcing tools can be useful. The 
Moral Machine project serves as an ex-
ample of a tool that empowers the pub-
lic engagement component of our ap-
proach to putting ‘society in the loop.’ 
It exemplifies interdisciplinary collab-
oration that combines tools from phi-
losophy, psychology, humanities, com-
puter science and statistics, to inform 
our quest for a world teeming with in-
creasingly intelligent and autonomous 
machines that nevertheless behave in 
line with human values. 
b We note here that in order to keep the proj-
ect tractable, the MM experiment had to con-
strain the possible responses that participants 
can provide. This is precisely why we do not be-
lieve the MM responses are sufficient, on their 
own, to inform the programming of automat-
ed vehicles, which should take into account 
a variety of perspectives, and the real-world 
complexity of actual dilemmas of risk distri-
bution. Recent work by Sütfeld et al.26 suggests 
the MM results do generalize to different ways 
of presenting the stimulus, but more work re-
mains to be done on this problem to test the 
external validity of the findings.
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